The Seahawks are three years into their reset and arguably have not taken many steps forward since 2018.
The massive use of resources this year was an attempt to accelerate improvement but, with three regular season games to go, the jury’s out on whether they succeeded.
A challenging off-season in 2020 isn’t solely responsible for the reset stalling. Their use of high picks between 2018-2020 also warrants a discussion.
2018 — the decision to draft Rashaad Penny
It was the perfect storm.
The Seahawks’ running game had collapsed in 2017. Russell Wilson led the team in rushing. Eddie Lacy had been a gigantic flop. Promising rookie Chris Carson was injured early in the season.
Seattle had lost their identity and a lot of that was tied to their inability to run the ball.
The running back class in 2018 was the strength of the draft. Multiple players were expected to be taken early, starting with Saquon Barkley in the top five.
There was an opportunity to kick start the running game with a high pick at the position. After all, Carson had only played in four career games by that point and had experienced injury issues in college. Adding a player made sense — in terms of philosophy and what was available in the draft.
Everything was set up for Seattle. They only had four picks going into the 2018 draft (and wouldn’t pick again until round four following their initial selection). Trading down from #18 was inevitable. They dropped to #27, acquiring an extra third rounder from Green Bay, and found themselves in the perfect position.
Barkely had been taken #2 overall by the Giants. Every other running back was still on the board. Between picks #27 and #43, five running backs would be drafted.
Seattle had their pick of the bunch.
In terms of executing a draft plan, it couldn’t have worked any better. They filled the gap between rounds one and four by trading down and could now select the player they truly wanted.
As we’ve discussed over the years, the Seahawks have a very particular ‘type’ of running back. All of the players they’ve drafted match a certain size and testing benchmark. For more information, read my big combine preview from February.
We’ve been able to reduce the number of potential targets every year and we’ve been able to hit on a number of drafted players as a consequence.
For example, in 2016 only two players fit Seattle’s criteria:
C.J. Prosise — 6-0, 220lbs, 35.5 inch vert, 10-1 broad
Kenneth Dixon — 5-10, 215lbs, 37.5 inch vert, 10-8 broad
We were able to reduce the entire class down to two players — and identify who they would go on to select.
In 2017, only four players fit their criteria:
Christopher Carson — 6-0, 218lbs, 37 inch vert, 10-10 broad
Brian Hill — 6-0, 219lbs, 34 inch vert, 10-5 broad
Alvin Kamara — 5-10, 214lbs, 39.5 inch vert, 10-11 broad
Joe Williams — 5-11, 210lbs, 35 inch vert, 10-5 broad
Once again, we reduced the group down and found the player they wanted.
In 2018, there was a much bigger list. This was a superior running back class, with several players who fit what the Seahawks look for:
Saquon Barkley — 6-0, 233lbs, 41 inch vert DNP broad
Kerryon Johnson — 5-11, 213lbs 40 inch vert, 10-6 broad
Bo Scarborough — 6-0, 228lbs, 40 inch vert, 10-9 broad
Nick Chubb — 5-11, 227lbs, 38.5 inch vert, 10-8 broad
John Kelly — 5-10, 216lbs, 35 inch vert, 10-0 broad
Lavon Coleman — 5-10, 223lbs, 33 inch vert, 10-0 broad
Rashaad Penny — 5-11, 220lbs, 32.5 inch vert, 10-0 broad
Royce Freeman — 5-11, 229lbs, 34 inch vert, 9-10 broad
Once again we identified the group they would likely pick from and they selected Rashaad Penny.
Ultimately though, this was the first mistake of the reset.
One of Pete Carroll or John Schneider (I can’t remember which) referenced that Penny received their highest ‘health’ grade going into the 2018 draft. I suspect this is what separated him from the pack. Carson, Prosise, Lacy and Thomas Rawls had all been banged up. They needed a durable runner who they could depend on — just as they’d been able to depend on Marshawn Lynch.
The problem is, Penny wasn’t tested in college. He was the starter at San Diego State for only one season.
Prior to the 2017 season, he backed up Donnel Pumphrey. You might recall that Pumphrey was a 5-8, 176lbs running back. It’s not often that a running back with that stature succeeds, however Pumphrey passed Ron Dayne for the all-time NCAA Division I FBS lead in career rushing yards in his final season.
So basically Penny started for only one season in a conference where a 5-8, 176lbs running back was able to set college records for rushing. This was never enough of a challenge to properly judge his durability, yet it appears to have been one of the determining factors.
We’ll never know for sure but I suspect Seattle would’ve taken Nick Chubb had Penny been unavailable.
Chubb had everything they looked for in a running back. He had the ideal ‘Seahawks size’ at 5-11 and 227lbs. He was highly explosive — jumping a 38.5 inch vertical and a 10-8 broad jump. He was no slouch either — running a 4.52 forty and adding a 4.25 short shuttle.
His combine performance was an absolute masterclass. A dream performance you’d think from a Seahawks perspective.
On the field he was incredibly physical and tough. His running style was a perfect fit for Seattle’s offense. He dominated for multiple years in the SEC — helping lead Georgia to the National Championship game in his final season.
He’d also overcome great adversity. Chubb suffered a horrifying knee injury in 2015 but returned to play two more seasons in college. He was rusty in 2016 but the following year, he was back to his old self — as shown by a sensational performance against Oklahoma in the playoffs.
The knee injury — and the possible feedback and medical checks they’d done on it — might’ve been the difference maker. After all, Penny hadn’t experienced any setbacks like this (but he also didn’t play much until 2017).
The thing is, Chubb had already come back and played two more years. He didn’t miss any time after returning and was a picture of durability aside from that one freakish moment.
If anything you’d think the adversity he showed to fight back from that injury would give him a fantastic off-setting grade in the ‘grit’ category.
The Seahawks took Penny and Chubb was selected by the Browns eight picks later.
Chubb has missed four games in his NFL career in three years. He played a full 16 games in 2018 and 2019. He missed some time with an ankle injury this season but has since returned faster and stronger than ever.
Here’s his statline (yards/touchdowns) since returning from injury:
124-2
108-2
126-1
114-0
144-1
80-1
82-2
He has 3371 rushing yards in two and a bit seasons, 27 total touchdowns and is clearly one of the best runners in the NFL.
Cleveland’s entire offensive identity revolves around Chubb and Kareem Hunt.
Rashaad Penny meanwhile has missed 21 games in his NFL career. He has just 789 rushing yards and six total touchdowns. There’s very little confidence in him to emerge as RB1 next year, with Chris Carson set to reach free agency.
This was a very avoidable error. Chubb is basically the poster child for what a Seahawks runner should be. It’s not a mere convenience to point to a great player they passed on and say they should’ve drafted him. Chubb is everything they look for.
Had they taken him instead, the Seahawks could have the running game the Browns currently possess. They’d also have the security to not pay Carson next year because Chubb would still be under contract for two more years.
Perhaps they saw a poor mans Todd Gurley in Penny? After all — he showed real ability as a receiver and a returner at San Diego State (things we haven’t seen in Seattle). Gurley at the time was setting the NFL alight.
Yet ultimately this feels like an overthink on Seattle’s behalf. Chubb should’ve been their man and with him, they likely would’ve returned their running game to the Marshawn Lynch days — when it was the most fearsome ground attack in the NFL.
2019 — the wrong plan, badly executed
The Seahawks wanted a pass rusher and a safety.
We can say that with a great deal of confidence. For staters, those are the two positions they selected with their top two picks. Secondly, they had a gaping hole at defensive end following the Frank Clark trade and they’ve since added three safeties at great expense.
Yet the way they handled the week of the 2019 draft has arguably done more harm than anything to Seattle’s reset.
The Seahawks traded Clark to the Chiefs in the days leading up to the draft. The thought process was perfectly logical. They avoided paying Clark $20m a year and the upcoming draft class was well know for its depth of talent on the defensive line.
Theoretically the trade allowed them to add to their paltry number of picks (they didn’t have a second rounder due to the Duane Brown trade) and find a cheap replacement for Clark.
So they entered the draft with picks #21 and #29 and seemingly felt confident (based on their later comments that the board worked against them) that they were going to land a top defensive lineman from a great positional class. There’s been a few rumours that their main targets were Rashan Gary and Brian Burns.
Gary was very similar to Clark. He was highly explosive, well sized and surprisingly agile. His combine testing was superb and he would’ve been an ideal replacement based on profile.
There were significant rumours that a shoulder injury had moved Gary down many boards. Some prominent mock drafts were starting to project him in the early 20’s and he was often paired with Seattle.
Burns, meanwhile, had the classic frame for a Seahawks LEO. He was long, lean, explosive and quick. He was adept at winning 1v1 off the edge. He too would’ve been a tremendous addition.
Perhaps they received bad intel? Or maybe they just whiffed on their own internal projections? Gary was gone by pick #12 and Burns was off the board by #16. Neither got close to pick #21.
With both players gone, the Seahawks traded down to #30.
A lot of people have speculated that by moving down they missed out on Montez Sweat and Jerry Tillery. I don’t buy that, personally.
Sweat’s heart condition was a serious concern and I wouldn’t blame any team for taking him off their board. He was being projected as a top-10 pick prior to the discovery of the defect, so if the Seahawks were prepared to select him they probably would’ve taken Sweat at #21 (especially given their huge need for a pass rusher).
Tillery never struck me as a Seahawks type of player. He had an odd character and flattered to deceive on the field. He had the physical skills but I’m not convinced Seattle were ever seriously interested in him.
I’m speculating a lot here — but I think Gary and Burns coming off the board early was a crushing blow. There were other D-liners available at #21 and they were desperate to add one. It made no sense to trade down if they really wanted Sweat or Tillery. I am convinced that they pinned their hopes on Gary or Burns being available and all the talk of the draft not going there way was directly linked to the pair.
Perhaps if Gary makes it to #16, Burns is available at #21? Maybe he would’ve just lasted all the way to #21 himself? We’ll never know.
Moving down to #30 feels like resignation, in hindsight. They’d missed out, so they were going to trade down and see the lay of the land at the end of round one.
I think, once the two pass rushers had gone off the board, they had their eye on Johnathan Abram. Clearly they wanted a safety. Abram tested superbly at the combine. He was a tone-setter at Mississippi State and he played with the style they like at the position.
An ideal first round could’ve been getting one of Burns or Gary and then Abram. That might’ve been their ‘plan A’.
When the Raiders took Abram with the 27th pick, all three were gone.
That is my best guess as to why they looked so gloomy in their press conference after the first round. They’d come out empty handed, missing on their targets — days after trading away the one good pass rusher on the roster.
This is the first mistake from the 2019 draft. They misjudged the situation and projected poorly. With picks #21 and #29 they should’ve made sure they landed at least one of their targets — even if it meant moving up a few spots or simply taking someone they really wanted at #21. There was a reason why they looked so miserable in the press conference after. I can’t believe there wasn’t anyone available at #21, or a viable trade-up option, to avoid this scenario.
The second mistake was not being prepared to pivot away from their targeted positional needs. Once the draft had started to work against them, the reaction needed to be to take a breath and look at who the best players available were.
There was still a lot of talent available — particularly at receiver. As much as the D-line class received rave reviews in 2019, wide out was also considered a strength.
Quality offensive linemen were also available.
I think the Seahawks were so focused on addressing their defensive end and safety needs that they simply selected the next players on their board instead of drafting for value. Thus, you end up with L.J. Collier and Marquise Blair.
For what it’s worth, I liked both Collier and Blair going into that draft. Collier had a sensational Senior Bowl and his tape was good. Blair was a head hunter at safety who packed a punch and he had plus athletic skills.
I’m not sure either warranted being the foundation for your entire draft, however — and they might’ve been available much later on.
Rather than take the next best player at those two specific positions to fill needs, Seattle should’ve looked at other areas. For example — Deebo Samuel and A.J. Brown left the board in the range Seattle was picking in. Terry McLaurin went later — but we spent a ton of time before the draft discussing his suitability as a late first round target.
All three fit Seattle’s preferred physical traits at receiver. As did D.K. Metcalf, who they thankfully took later on to salvage the draft class.
Had the Seahawks accepted their fate, they could’ve easily had Samuel, Brown or McLaurin (who, as it happens, received a rave review from Pete Carroll during yesterday’s press conference).
Again, this isn’t just me handpicking good players and saying they should’ve been drafted. Every year we discuss what Seattle looks for at receiver. They have to run in the 4.4’s or faster. Samuel, Brown and McLaurin did that, unlike N’Keal Harry who was taken just before all three. We talked a lot about Samuel in particular due to his amazing performance in Mobile. He and McLaurin were arguably the two standout players at the Senior Bowl that year.
Imagine a situation where the Seahawks had taken one of Samuel, Brown or McLaurin, then taken an interior offensive lineman such as Elgton Jenkins or Erik McCoy, before trading up for Metcalf? The receiver position would now be set up for years to come. Russell Wilson would be pinching himself. They’d have a long term solution at center or left guard too.
Sure, they wouldn’t have been able to add a defensive end or safety. So what? They started the season with Tedric Thompson and Bradley McDougald anyway — so there was no need to force the Blair pick. They could’ve pushed that need into 2020, especially given they then traded for Quandre Diggs and Jamal Adams.
On the defensive line, they immediately signed Ziggy Ansah after the draft because they knew Collier wasn’t an immediate impact player. I suspect they would’ve traded for Jadeveon Clowney anyway, even if Collier didn’t get hurt in training camp.
There really wasn’t any reason to stick so strictly to the two positions once the board went against Seattle in 2019. The end result is thus — Collier looks like a thoroughly average, rotational player who is seeing his snaps decrease:
Jets — 18 (34%)
Giants — 24 (43%)
Eagles — 29 (41%)
Cardinals — 24 (36%)
For all the promise Blair has shown in flashes, the Seahawks were clearly unconvinced by his starting potential (thus the Diggs & Adams trades) and he was moved to nickel before his injury.
The double act of trading Clark and then spending two high picks in the way they did is one of the biggest reasons why the reset has not guided Seattle back to the top.
It’s not unrealistic at all to imagine a scenario where the Seahawks drafted Nick Chubb, kept Clark and then drafted Deebo Samuel, A.J. Brown or Terry McLaurin to go with D.K. Metcalf. Wishful thinking? Sure. Unrealistic? Not at all.
These are the kind of moves that the 2010-12 Seahawks would’ve nailed. Get those two drafts right and this team could’ve been truly special.
2020 — desperation and the Darrell Taylor pick
Both Schneider and Carroll spelled it out numerous times. They needed to fix the pass rush. That was the priority.
Seattle’s 2019 pass rush was as bad as their 2017 running game. They were a one-man band, relying totally on Jadeveon Clowney for any kind of pressure. Ziggy Ansah was a huge bust. Quinton Jefferson offered a bit here and there. The rest? Ineffective.
They said retaining Clowney was a priority. I believe them. I think they truly intended to re-sign him and the rest of the off-season would follow from there.
I think they calculated, correctly, that his market wouldn’t be what he expected. The Seahawks are very good at working the room at the combine, finding out information. I suspect nobody out-works John Schneider in Indianapolis.
Their plan made sense. Offer Clowney a deal that could be the best on the table but ultimately won’t be what he expects. Then lean on the strong relationship they established to ‘recruit’ him back to Seattle.
Nobody could’ve predicted what happened next. Clowney’s unwillingness to sign any contract below what he felt he was worth was an unprecedented move. I don’t blame the Seahawks for not anticipating it and I don’t blame Clowney for sticking to his guns. It was simply an unfortunate situation.
Sadly, it seemed to negatively impact both parties.
Clowney’s stance didn’t help his bargaining position. He simply cost himself money and I suspect the truncated nature of the whole saga had a negative impact on his play in the end.
For Seattle, they were stuck. They couldn’t splash out on other players because they wanted Clowney and knew the minute they spent big money on others, retaining him was impossible. They kept money available pretty much throughout the off-season on the off-chance he would sign. It never happened.
It meant that they missed out on a host of other pass rushers, ended up frittering money away on cheap deals in order to try and save something for Clowney — only to end up using a lot of their remaining money on other bargain bin signings.
Anyone who was prepared to be honest about the situation knew Benson Mayowa and Bruce Irvin were not adequate additions to fix a pass rush. The Seahawks needed more but following the first flush of free agency it wasn’t obvious how they were going to get it. Either they’d have to find a resolution with Clowney, or they’d have to try and sign someone like Everson Griffen. Or they could look to the draft.
It wasn’t a good draft class for pass rushers. The options weren’t great, even with the Seahawks owning three picks in the first two rounds.
Yet there was one player who clearly appealed.
Tennessee’s Darrell Taylor looked like a Seahawks pass rusher. His chiselled frame, his unnatural ability to bend the arc and straighten to the quarterback. This was exactly what the Seahawks were looking for. He was nearly 6-4 and 267lbs with 33 inch arms. He was long, lean, athletic and powerful.
The only problem is he’d suffered a serious leg injury that required a titanium rod to be inserted into his leg.
He wasn’t able to perform at the Senior Bowl or combine as a consequence. Making matters worse was the emergence of a global pandemic. Teams would test and probe an injury like this for weeks before the draft. Now, information was severely limited.
Draft insiders speculated whether Taylor would go undrafted as a consequence. There was so little known about the injury, it was unclear whether he’d even pass a medical. While there was no doubting his talent and potential — if he couldn’t even get on the field to practise, nothing else mattered.
I remember doing several podcasts during draft season where I was asked about Taylor and the reaction was usually one of shock when I mentioned he could go undrafted. This was a unique year for the NFL, with teams having far less information than they’d ever had before.
I assumed a lot of teams wouldn’t have Taylor on their draft boards. I thought for weeks he’d be a day three pick at best. It was only in the build up to the draft, when Pete Schrager mocked him to Seattle in round one, that the conversation flipped.
Incidentally, who is telling Pete Schrager who the Seahawks are going to draft? And why? If he knows, presumably other teams will know? Likewise, why did Chris Mortensen know enough to tell Russell Wilson he was going to be drafted by Seattle in 2012? I digress, but still.
I think the Seahawks felt a lot of pressure to get a pass rusher during the 2020 draft. Clowney was still available and there was enough cap space to bring him back. Carroll spoke after the draft and went to great lengths to say the door was still open for a return. Adding a cheap rookie pass rusher was cost-effective insurance. It did make sense, in fairness, if they wanted to leave the door open for Clowney.
Yet the decision to target Taylor specifically — so much so that they traded up for him — was clearly a misjudgement.
He’s been on the NFI list all year. Carroll recently revealed his leg is structurally healed — yet he’s still not practising because he doesn’t feel right.
This isn’t a typical return like you’d see with a player coming back from an ACL or a high ankle sprain. Taylor has a titanium rod in his leg. I can only imagine how mentally challenging it must be to feel confident enough to play such an aggressive sport at a pro level in this situation.
His rookie season is a write-off. The hope has to be that in a years time he’ll not only be mentally ready to return but that he’ll physically be ready too. He won’t have played football for two years and the leg will always be a potential issue.
Spending two high picks on Taylor was reckless and far too risky this year. Had the Seahawks been able to do all of the usual medical checks in a non-Covid year, I’d have more sympathy with them. This feels like a desperate pick in hindsight. Desperate because of the situation with the pass rush post-free agency, desperate because of what happened with Clowney and desperate because they zoned in on a player with major red flags and traded up for him anyway.
If he never plays — and let’s be honest, we have to at least consider that a possibility — or if he struggles to regain his best form after this long layoff, the Seahawks will have wasted two high picks in the year where they needed a strong off-season to push them back into contention.
It would also mean that four first and second round picks were spent on Collier, Blair and Taylor in two drafts. That’s not a good return so far, with little cause for optimism in the future. It’s especially disappointing when you see who else was available.
The Seahawks seem to get themselves into trouble when they go into a draft with a massive glaring need. Their best picks in recent years — D.K. Metcalf and Damien Lewis — have been opportunistic moves. Really talented players lasting longer than they should’ve done and you capitalise.
You could even make that case for Jordyn Brooks. He has shown some flashes of talent. Seattle didn’t desperately need a linebacker this year but felt that was a strong position at the end of round one.
Their inability to solve problems in free agency to allow the draft to come to them has been a sticking point in 2019 and 2020 and is one of the main reasons why the reset has failed to deliver a much improved team.
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