The Seahawks entered the 2019 off-season facing a huge dilemma.
One way or another they had to sort out Russell Wilson’s future. Three other players were also approaching the final year of their contracts — Bobby Wagner, Jarran Reed and, thanks to the franchise tag, Frank Clark.
The intention was clearly to try and keep all four. When asked about Clark at the combine, both Pete Carroll and John Schneider said they expected him in Seattle. Carroll in particular said multiple times, quite firmly, that Clark would be with the team in 2019.
It felt like they were keen to get him signed to a deal worth about $18m per year — the amount of the tag. The game-changer was Demarcus Lawrence’s contract in Dallas. A stalemate was abruptly ended when the Cowboys agreed to pay him $21m a year. Suddenly a player with production but not the quality of Khalil Mack or Aaron Donald was earning elite money. Now Clark could realistically ask for the same.
Nobody can really complain about the Seahawks deciding they were better off seeing what else was out there. $21m is a lot of money. Only four defensive linemen are paid more — Donald, Mack, Lawrence and now DeForest Buckner. Seattle had to make a call on whether Clark’s 32 sacks in three seasons, including 13 in 2018, warranted a placing among the leagues elite. Clearly they decided it wasn’t enough.
They made a trade for a late first round pick and a second round pick. Those players ended up being, ultimately, L.J. Collier and Damien Lewis.
The thought process and logic was perfectly plausible — especially when Wilson and Wagner signed their contracts. Had they signed Clark to the deal he received in Kansas City, here are the cumulative cap hits for all three players per year for the following four seasons:
2019 — $48.5m
2020 — $65.05m
2021 — $74.95m
2022 — $83.65m
On paper, that’s hard to accept. Yet there are some other things to consider.
For starters, Clark’s cap hit in 2020 is $19.3m. The Seahawks are spending $19.1m of their cap space on K.J. Wright, Bruce Irvin and Jacob Hollister. You could argue they’d be better off with Clark — especially with the depth they’ve got at tight end and having just spent a first round pick on a linebacker.
The $74.95m hit is incredibly steep in 2021. However, the Seahawks are currently slated to have about $63m in available cap space at the end of this season. They could tolerate Clark’s cap hit of $25.8m. It’d also be their final year without an ‘out’ in the contract. The Chiefs can’t cut or trade Clark until 2022 due to the dead-money on the deal. Having between $30-40m to spend wouldn’t have prevented Seattle from filling out the depth on their roster. They would’ve also had two full draft classes by then (2020 & 2021).
By 2022 the Seahawks would have a lot of freedom and flexibility. If a 29-year-old Clark was no longer providing a high level of performance they could cut or trade him and save $13.4m. They could also cut or trade Wagner and save a further $17m. If they needed money, they could find it.
The other thing to consider are the extensions the Seahawks might want to do that’ll eat into future cap space. Chris Carson and Shaquill Griffin are the two big names who are out of contract at the end of the 2020 season. Neither player has shown they warrant a big extension at this stage.
Clearly this was a choice by Seattle not to go beyond their limit for Clark — which, as noted, was seemingly set at the franchise tag limit of $18m.
But how did that unwillingness to stretch to another $3m per year impact the roster reset overall?
This is the big question and one that warrants some consideration moving forward.
When the Seahawks refreshed their roster in 2018 it was an attempt to establish a new core and identify the players they would build around moving forward. The 2018 team were competitive and often exciting if somewhat flawed. They still recorded impressive home wins against Kansas City, Green Bay and Minnesota. They gave the Rams two almighty battles. They finished 10-6 but it could’ve easily been more. Two disappointing road losses to start the year put them behind the eight-ball and they shouldn’t have lost on the road in San Francisco. 11-13 wins was possible and would’ve felt more authentic than perhaps even last season.
They had their big beasts — Wilson, Wagner, Carson, Duane Brown, Tyler Lockett and two defensive linemen (Clark and Reed) who delivered 23.5 sacks. The path to future success was clear. Build around that group. It was going to be tricky in 2019 because they only had four draft picks and limited cap space.
That in part was probably another inspiration for trading Clark — to get another pick and free up some cash. Yet by dealing him the Seahawks were doing the opposite of building at the exact time they needed to be adding not subtracting.
The 2019 draft class was rich in defensive linemen. It felt like an ideal opportunity, even with only four picks, to add to what they had. That too probably gave the Seahawks false hope that they could deal Clark and handle the loss. As it happens — the rush on the position caught them out when both Rashan Gary and Brian Burns went quickly. They traded out of range for their secondary targets and seemingly settled on L.J. Collier to avoid missing out on the defensive linemen altogether.
That could end up being the defining moment of the reset, unfortunately. That’s the negative way of looking at it anyway. Since that trade, the Seahawks went from relying on Frank Clark for a pass rush to having nobody who could deliver a pass rush. The Jadeveon Clowney trade bailed them out before the 2019 season — but they were unwilling, so far, to commit to bringing him back too.
If he doesn’t return, he’ll have cost a third round pick for one season.
Instead of building and growing the unit, the Seahawks smashed a big hole into their pass rush. They’ve since been scrambling to find solutions. Ansah, Clowney — now trading up for Darrell Taylor and signing Benson Mayowa and Bruce Irvin. They’re trying to find answers instead of building. In 2019, the lack of pass rush was crippling. There’s a danger the same issue will prevent them from succeeding in 2020 too.
Removing Clark created a big problem — one that they’ve struggled to solve.
Again — the logic behind the trade was perfectly understandable at the time. In hindsight, especially if they don’t return to a Super Bowl in the next couple of years, we’ll wonder if their unwillingness to go from $18m to $21m a year was costly. Especially if their future answers to the problem have a similar lack of success as Ansah and Collier in 2019.
Sometimes you just have to pay the going rate for a good player.
Hindsight is a wonderful thing though. Nobody makes a decision to get it wrong. If a decision is logical — and Seattle trading Clark was — then you have to temper any criticism. You can also, however, discuss that decision and question whether it was the right move after all. As of today, it’s hard to argue the Seahawks are in a better position for dealing Clark.
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